

Yale Early Career Ethics Workshop Schedule

Friday April 28, 2023

Session 1: Harkness Hall 203

12:00 – 1:10 Z Quanbeck (UNC Chapel Hill), 'A Constitutive Inheritance Account of the Ethical Significance of Belief'

1:20 – 2:30 Merve Tapinc (Boston University), 'Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?'

2:40 – 3:50 Philip Li (USC), 'Asymmetry of value-based normative reasons'

Keynote 1: Harkness Hall 207

4:00 – 6:00 Caspar Hare (MIT), 'Ought I to Want You to Do What You Ought to Do?'

Abstract: Suppose that you are doing something and I am passively watching. Suppose that you and I know all the same things, and have all the same attachments. Suppose that there is something you ought to do. In circumstances like this, is it always the case that I ought to want you to do what you ought to do? This is a tricky question for advocates of deontological moral theories to answer. I recommend that they answer it like this: It is always the case that any attitude you ought to have, I ought to have, and vice-versa. But sometimes we both ought to be curiously ambivalent. We both ought to want-in-one-way that you do the right thing, and both ought to want-in-another-way that you do the wrong thing. The difference between these two ways-of-wanting is already apparent in another well-understood theory of the practical ought: causal decision theory.

Conference Dinner 1

6:30 Zaroka (148 York St.)

Saturday April 29, 2023

8:30 Light breakfast and coffee

Session 2: Humanities Quadrangle 401

9:00 – 10:10 James Evershed (UC Berkeley), 'Sometimes the only way is down'

10:20– 11:30 Aidan Penn (NYU), 'Prerogatives Under Risk'

11:40 – 12:50 Weng Kin San (USC), 'Aggregating value across time and persons'

12:50 – 2:00 Lunch break

Session 3: Humanities Quadrangle 401

2:00 – 3:10 Owen Clifton (Queen's University), 'Why worry about population ethics?'

3:20 – 4:30 Lea Bourguignon (LSE), 'On the possibility of act contractualism'

Keynote 2: Humanities Quadrangle 401

4:45 – 6:45 Shelly Kagan (Yale), 'Death, Deprivation, and Rational Regret'

Abstract: Is death a bad thing? According to the deprivation account, death is bad because the dead don't get the various goods that they would have if only they were still alive. But it's not normally a misfortune when a merely possible good doesn't come your way. Bill Gates didn't write you a check for a million dollars today, but it would be silly to be upset at that. So how can death actually be bad? This talk will explore a promising answer.

Conference Dinner 2

7:00 Lalibela (176 Temple St.)

Sunday April 30, 2023

9:00 Light breakfast and coffee

Session 4: Humanities Quadrangle 401

9:30 – 10:40 Margot Witte (Michigan), 'Is this what I really want?: murky wants, a problem for consent'

10:50 – 12:00 Alex Horne (Cambridge), 'The self-improvement machine'