Synopsis: Although almost all other philosophers reject the
idea that temporal proximity could matter morally, I argue that
this view is more defensible than is commonly supposed
Ancestor: Time discounting, consistency, and special
obligations: a defence of Robust Temporalism. Global Priorities
Institute, working paper no. 11-2021. [pdf
|
hyperlink
| email me for a more recent draft]
Won the Oxford Global Priorities Institute's 2021
Essay Prize for Global Priorities Research (£1000)
Work
influenced:
S. J. Beard and Patrick Kaczmarek, 2024. Existential
risk, astronomical waste, and the reasonableness of a pure
time preference for well-being. Monist, 107.2,
157-75. [open-access pdf
|
doi]
David Thorstad, 2023. Papers
I learned from (Part 1: Time discounting, consistency, and
special obligations). Reflective
Altruism blog post. [hyperlink]
2025:
Disagreement, AI alignment, and bargaining.
Philosophical Studies, 182.7, 1757-87 [pre-publication
pdf |
doi]
Synopsis: When stakeholders disagree about how an AI
should behave, resolving this disagreement through simulated
bargaining is better than resolving it through voting or
expected value maximisation
Gentrification: a philosophical analysis and critique.
Journal of Urban Affairs, 47.4, 1246-64.[pre-publication
pdf |
doi]
Synopsis: Forms of gentrification that don't displace
many land users are still pro tanto morally
objectionable insofar as they damage local communities